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COMMENTS
be conducted, should prevent undue delays. The effect of this
article would be to require the timely fixing of cases for trial
so as to give the accused a reasonable time in which to object
to the petit jury venire before the fifth day prior to trial.
David M. Ellison, Jr.
Venue in Louisiana Criminal Cases under
Amended Article 13, Code of Criminal Procedure
The rule governing venue in criminal cases, that an accused
ordinarily must be tried in the locality where the crime was
committed, has its origin in the common law institution of trial
by jury. Under the rules of early English criminal procedure, the
jury was composed of the witnesses to the crime.
For the convenience of the forum and the witnesses, the trial
was held in the neighborhood where the crime was committed.
Later, when the jury became an "impartial weigher of the evi-
dence," not composed of the witnesses to the crime, the require-
ment of trial at the locus of the crime was continued.' The con-
tinuance of this requirement may be due to the factor of avail-
ability of witnesses and other considerations of trial convenience.
A strict application of the rule that trial must be in the county
where the crime was committed, however, has not always pro-
duced the best results. For this reason, most jurisdictions have
relaxed the rule by creating certain exceptions. 2 For example,
offenses committed within short, specified distances from a
county line can be tried in either county.3 Furthermore, a prose-
cution for larceny can be brought in any county into which the
stolen goods are carried.4 This exception to the rule has been
extended in some states to include other "continuing" crimes.5
1. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 367 (1947); PUTT-
KAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 156, n. 8 (1953).
2. 1 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 278 (1883): "A
rule which requires eighteen statutory exceptions, and such an evasion as
the last one mentioned in the case of theft [the continuing nature of the
crime]-the commonest of all offences-is obviously indefensible .... [A]ll
courts otherwise competent to try an offence should be competent to try it
irrespectively of the place where it was committed, the place of trial being
determined by the convenience of the court, the witnesses, and the person
accused. Of course, as a general rule, the county where the offence was
committed would be the most convenient for the purpose."
3. LA. R.S. 15:15 (1950); PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
159 (1953).
4. State v. McCoy, 42 La. Ann. 228, 7 So. 330 (1890); PUTTKAMMER, ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 157 (1953).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 786 (1872); S.D. REV. CODE § 4514 (1919).
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The Louisiana Legislature in 1855 adopted a comprehensive
venue statute. Section 12 of act 121 of that year provided that
"when any crime or misdemeanor shall be committed on the
boundary of two or more parishes, or within one hundred yards
thereof, or within one hundred yards of any other boundary, or
shall be begun in one parish and completed in another, it may be
dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in either
of the parishes in the same manner as if it had been actually and
wholly committed therein."7 At the time this act was adopted
the state constitution required only that the trial be by a jury of
the "vicinage. '5 Since 1864, however, the constitution has more
specifically provided that the trial shall be in the parish where
the crime was committed.9 Despite this constitutional provision,
section 12 of act 121 of 1855 was not repealed and, in fact, was
incorporated into the Revised Statutes of 187010 as section 988.
However, in 1905 in State v. Montgomery," the portion of the act
relating to crimes committed within one hundred yards of a
parish line was declared unconstitutional. The statute was given
what appeared to be the final blow in State v. Moore,21 where the
court found it to be invalid insofar as it conflicted with the con-
stitutional guaranty of trial in the parish where the offense is
committed. 13  However, when the present Constitution was
adopted in 1921, one of its provisions permitted trial in either
parish of crimes committed within one hundred feet of a parish
line.14 Moreover, in 1940 in State v. Hart,'5 the court apparently
revived section 988 of the Revised Statutes when it stated: "[W]e
are not aware of any constitutional objection to the provision in
Section 988 of the Revised Statutes, with reference to a crime that
was begun in one parish and completed in another."'16 The court
stated that the new constitutional provision superseded the
objection raised in State v. Montgomery,'7 but no mention was
made of State v. Moore. In 1942, as a result of complex problems
6. La. Acts 1855, No. 121, § 12, p. 151.
7. Ibid., included as LA. REV. STAT. § 988 (1870).
8. LA. CONST. art. 103 (1852).
9. LA. CONST. art. 105 (1864); LA. CONST. art. 6 (1868); LA. CONST. art. 7
(1879); LA. CONST, art. 9 (1898); LA. CONST. art. 9 (1913); LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 9 (1921).
10. LA. REV. STAT. § 988 (1870).
11. 115 La. 155, 38 So. 949 (1905).
12. 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916).
13. State v. Moore, 140 La. 281, 297, 72 So. 965, 970 (1916).
14. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
15. 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940).
16. State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 205, 196 So. 62, 69 (1940).
17. 115 La. 155, 38 So. 949 (1905). It should be noted that the Constitution
Is couched in terms of "100 feet" whereas section 988 reads "100 yards."
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of venue arising in a group of 1940 inter-parish venue cases,"8 a
more liberal venue provision was enacted in the form of an
amendment to article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 19 It
provides:
". where the several acts constituting a crime shall have
been committed in more than one parish, the offender may be
tried in any parish where a substantial element of the crime
has been committed. '20
The constitutionality of the amended article 13 was chal-
lenged in State v. Pollard,21 but the court in that case did not find
determination of the constitutional question essential to the
decision of the case. However, in State v. Ellerbe22 the court
stated that "the test in determining venue is not whether the
crime is a continuing one but whether it was perpetrated within
the Parish where the prosecution is had.''23 The court further
stated that amended article 13 must be "regarded as an aid or
guide to the Courts in determining the question of venue; it
obviously cannot expand the mandate of the Constitution or
limit the right secured thereunder. '24 The latter decision would
seem to indicate that the court did not question the constitution-
ality of the amended article 13, but in light of the quoted language
the construction which it will be given remains to be determined.
Significantly, statutes similar to amended article 13 in states
with comparable constitutional provisions have been held consti-
tutional.25 It is also well to note that the amended article 13 is
designed to remedy the situation existing at common law where-
by a prosecution for a multiple-element crime could not be
instituted in any county unless sufficient elements occurred in
one county to constitute the completed crime.26 As the amended
18. State v. Smith, 194 La. 1015, 195 So. 523 (1940); State v. Terzia, 194
La. 583, 194 So. 27 (1940); State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940); State
v. Matheny, 194 La. 198, 193 So. 587 (1940); State v. Todd, 194 La. 595, 194 So.
31 (1940).
19. La. Acts 1942, No. 147, § 1, art. 13, p. 502.
20. LA. R.S. 15:13 (1950).
21. 215 La. 655, 41 So.2d 465 (1949).
22. 217 La. 639, 47 So.2d 30 (1950).
23. State v. Ellerbe, 217 La. 639, 643, 47 So.2d 30, 31 (1950).
24. Id. at 644, 47 So.2d at 31, n. 1.
25. For a discussion of the constitutionality of such provisions, see Com-
ment, 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 321 (1942). The principle of amended article
13 is also recognized in the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure §§ 238-49. However, the Federal Rules require trial in the state and
district where the crime was committed, although the defendant can request
a change of venue if the crime was "committed" in two or more districts.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. CRIM. P. 18, 21(b); WHITMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 147, 154 (1950).
26. See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 129, 288 S.W. 1044 (1926).
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article is remedial and not penal, it should receive liberal con-
struction .2  A study of decisions from this and other jurisdictions
having similar statutory provisions will indicate the possible
scope of this venue rule. These cases can best be considered in
their substantive criminal law groupings.
Accessory After the Fact
In Louisiana the crime of being an accessory after the fact is
an offense separate and distinct from the principal felony.2 Thus
it would seem that where the two crimes are committed in sep-
arate parishes, each must be tried in the parish where it was
committed. Two cases have arisen in other jurisdictions in which
the defendants were indicted and prosecuted as accessories after
the fact in the county where the principal felony was perpetrated,
although the accessory acts were committed elsewhere. In one
case 29 there was a statute authorizing prosecution either in the
county of the principal felony or in the county where the acces-
sory acts were committed. 30 In the other case, 31 however, no such
statute existed and a prosecution of the accessory in the county of
the principal felony was held improper. Since Louisiana does not
have a statute permitting prosecution of the accessory in the
parish where the principal felony was committed, the courts of
this state may follow the latter decision.
Accessory Before the Fact
In Louisiana, the crime of being an accessory before the
fact has been abolished.32 Those parties so known at common law
are now classified as principals. 33 In order to ascertain the proper
venue for the trial of such accomplices, it is recommended that
one consider decisions which have treated those parties as acces-
sories before the fact. It has been rather consistently held that
where the procuring, aiding, or other accessory acts occurred in
one county and the principal offense occurred in another, the ac-
complice can be tried in either.3 4 Whether or not it would follow
that the person who actually committed the main offense is
amenable to prosecution in the county where he was induced
27. See, e.g., State v. Ashe, 182 Wash. 598, 603, 48 P.2d 213, 215 (1935).
28. LA. R.S. 14:23-24 (1950).
29. People v. Richetti, 193 Misc. 755, 85 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
30. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1934.
31. Tully v. Commonwealth, 76 Bush. 142 (Ky. 1877).
32. LA. R.S. 14:23-24 (1950).
33. Ibid.
34. Commonwealth v. Parker, 108 Ky. 673, 57 S.W. 484 (1900); People v.
Vario, 165 Misc. 842, 2 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1938); State v. Ayers, 8 Baxt. 96 (Tenn.
1874).
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to commit or was aided in committing the crime is open to
question.
Conspiracy
No Louisiana cases dealing with the venue of prosecutions
for conspiracy have been found, but several interesting cases
have arisen in other jurisdictions. In a New York case, where a
conspiracy to commit theft was entered into and false representa-
tions were made in one county and the property was stolen in
another, it was held that prosecution was proper in either coun-
ty.35 In a separate, later prosecution of one of the conspirators,36
whose only act in the county where he was being prosecuted
was the recordation of conveyances of the property stolen, the
court applied the common law rule that a conspirator or confed-
erate is bound by and held to have committed the acts of the
others.37 Although the defendant in that case was being tried for
theft,38 the same rule should apply to conspiracy, namely, that
any of the conspirators can be tried in the county where an
overt act by one of the confederates in furtherance of the con-
spiracy is committed. In a California case a conspiracy to procure
females to become inmates of a house of prostitution was entered
into and the procuring occurred in County A. Acts of prostitu-
tion by the females occurred in County B. Venue in County A
was held proper.33 Prosecution would also have been proper in
County B under the rule that a conspiracy can be tried in any
county where an overt act tending to give effect to the conspir-
acy is committed. 40 In Louisiana the same rule should apply
since criminal conspiracy requires an "act in furtherance of the
object" by one of the conspirators. 41
Homicide
No Louisiana cases have been discovered on the subject, but
several common law cases seem to have covered adequately the
problems concerning venue for homicide prosecutions. In New
York, which has a venue provision similar to our amended
35. People v. Wicks, 11 App. Div. 539, 42 N.Y. Supp. 630 (4th Dep't 1896),
aff'd, 154 N.Y. 766, 49 N.E. 1102 (1897).
36. People v. Peckens, 153 N.Y. 576, 47 N.E. 883 (1897).
37. 11 & 12 Vicr. c. 46, § 1 (1848); Regina v. Manning, 2 Car. & K. 887,
904, 175 Eng. Rep. 372, 380 (1849); People v. Bliven, 112 N.Y. 79, 19 N.E. 638
(1889).
38. People v. Peckens, 153 N.Y. 576, 47 N.E. 883 (1897).
39. People v. Marron, 140 Cal. App. 432, 35 P.2d 610 (1934); see People v.
Anderson, 90 Cal. App.2d 326, 202 P.2d 1044 (1949).
40. People v. Burton, 91 Cal. App.2d 695, 205 P.2d 1065 (1949).
41. LA. R.S. 14:26 (1950).
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article 13, the court considered venue in either county to be
proper in a case where the intent to kill was formed, preparation
was made, and the victim was either seized or enticed, all in
County A, and the killing occurred in County B. 42 In a Washing-
ton case, where a kidnapping occurred in County A and the body
of the victim was found in County B, the court held that either
county had venue jurisdiction even though it was not certain in
which county death occurred or where the fatal wound was in-
flicted.43
But there seem to be limitations to the applicability of
amended article 13 to such situations. Dictum in a Montana case44
indicates that venue would not be proper in County A when the
defendant forms the intent to kill and buys a gun in County A
and travels to County B where he kills the victim. The Montana
court felt that the acts of buying the gun in and traveling from
County A would be mere preliminary acts and not acts requisite
to the consummation of the offense. 45 Similarly, in Louisiana, it
could hardly be maintained that the formation of the intent to
kill or the purchase of a gun (merely a preparatory act) consti-
tutes a "substantial element" of the homicide within the mean-
ing of amended article 13. Common law cases applying the "sub-
stantial element" rule have indicated that the only act which
can definitely be called a substantial element of the crime is an
act directed toward the person of the victim, such as kidnapping
or inveigling and enticing him away,46 or shooting at him.
Other homicide cases from common law jurisdictions involv-
ing the crimes of abortion and illegal sale of whiskey have pre-
sented related problems. In an Iowa case,47 a prosecution for
manslaughter was held proper in County A, where death resulted
from an abortion performed in County B. The Iowa court rejected
the defendant's contention that venue could be proper only in
the county where the abortion was performed. It is to be noted
that had death not resulted, a prosecution for the abortion could
have been maintained only in County B where it occurred. How-
ever, the abortion and the resulting death of the victim were both
42. People v. Thorn, 21 Misc. 130, 47 N.Y. Supp. 46 (1897), aff'd, 156 N.Y.
286, 50 N.E. 947 (1898); see Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426, 7 N.E. 225 (1886);
People v. Lee, 334 Mich. 217, 54 N.W.2d 305 (1952).
43. State v. Wilson, 38 Wash.2d 593, 231 P.2d 288 (1951).
44. State v. Hudson, 13 Mont. 112, 32 Pac. 413 (1893).
45. Id. at 115, 32 Pac. at 414.
46. Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426 (1886); People v. Lee, 334 Mich. 217, 54
N.W.2d 305 (1952); People v. Thorn, 21 Misc. 130, 47 N.Y. Supp. 46 (1897);
State v. Wilson, 38 Wash.2d 593, 231 P.2d 288 (1951).
47. State v. Sweeny, 203 Iowa 1305, 214 N.W. 735 (1927).
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substantial elements of the crime of manslaughter, and the
prosecution was proper in either county.48 A similar result would
be reached under Louisiana's amended article 13.
In a New York case, 49 the defendant bought wood alcohol in
County A, made whiskey illegally and sold it in County B, and
death resulting from the purchaser's consumption of the whiskey
occurred in another state. The defendant contended that the
New York venue statute required the occurrence of acts or effects
requisite to the consummation of the offense in County A for that
county to have venue jurisdiction. The defendant felt that since
none of the effects of the crime occurred in County A, he should
not be subject to prosecution there. The court held that venue
was properly laid in County A. However, in dealing with similar
facts the Oklahoma court reached a different result. In that
case,50 the whiskey was sold and delivered in County A. The
purchaser gave some to friends, one of whom died in County B
from drinking it. The court refused to recognize venue in County
A. In the writer's opinion, in both the New York and Oklahoma
cases the acts in County A were too remote from the homicide
to constitute a ubstantial element of the crime. Should similar
situations arise in Louisiana, our courts would seem compelled
to follow the Oklahoma decision in applying amended article 13.
Robbery
There seems to be no Louisiana case concerning venue prob-
lems in robbery cases, but several common law decisions have
discussed venue in this respect. In a Kentucky case,51 where the
defendant drew a gun on the victim in County A and took the
latter's dogs from him in County B, the court held that either
county would have venue jurisdiction over the offense of assault
with intent to rob. The court treated the crime as a continuing
one. In a similar case5 2 arising in Oklahoma, the defendant en-
tered the victim's car in County A, threatened him with a gun,
and forced him to drive to County B, where he robbed him of the
car and drove away with it. The court held that a prosecution in
County B was proper. While the court did not state that prosecu-
tion in County A would also have been proper, it is submitted
that it would have been.
48. Id. at 1309, 214 N.W. at 737.
49. People v. Licenziata, 199 App. Div. 106, 191 N.Y. Supp. 619 (2d Dep't
1921).
50. Ex parte Lucas, 33 Okla. Crim. 407, 243 Pac. 990 (1926).
51. Arnett v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 335, 109 S.W.2d 795 (1937).
52. Richardson v. State, 61 Okla. Crim. 278, 67 P.2d 804 (1937).
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Two common law cases involved statutes recognizing the
continuing nature of such crimes. The statutes provided in effect
that where property taken by burglary, robbery, larceny, or em-
bezzlement in one county is brought to another, either has juris-
diction.53 In one case,5 4 the defendant forced the victim to drive
the latter's car from County A to a certain point in County B,
at which point the defendant forced the victim out and robbed
him of his car. The court found the statute applicable to the case
and held venue proper in either county. In the other case 5  the
defendant hired a taxi in County A and instructed the driver to
go to County B, where he robbed him. The defendant immedi-
ately returned to County A with the stolen property, where he
was later prosecuted. In recognizing venue in County A the
court said that "the procuring of the taxi under such circum-
stances . . . justified the court in concluding that it was simply
a part of the scheme requisite or employed for the consummation
of the offense of robbery." The court further stated that, where
"the means employed for the consummation of a criminal offense
has a situs or location in one county, and the completed offense
takes place in another, .. .both counties may entertain jurisdic-
tion."56 The reasoning of these decisions would seem equally
appropriate under Louisiana's amended article 13.
Theft
At common law and in Louisiana prior to 1942, larceny,
embezzlement, and obtaining by false pretenses were treated as
separate crimes. As indicated before, larceny was treated as a
continuing crime and venue considered proper in any county or
parish into which the stolen property was taken. 7 Although no
Louisiana cases on the subject have been found, embezzlement
was also treated as a continuing crime at common law.58 On the
other hand, the crime of obtaining by false pretenses was never
treated as a continuing crime in Louisiana or at common law,
and prosecution had to take place where the actual obtaining was
effected.59 With the adoption of the Louisiana Criminal Code in
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 786 (1949); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 4514 (1929).
54. State v. Hanrahan, 49 S.D. 434, 207 N.W. 224 (1926).
55. People v. Anderson, 3 Cal. App.2d 521, 40 P.2d 270 (1935).
56. Id. at 523, 40 P.2d at 271.
57. State v. McCoy, 42 La. Ann. 228, 7 So. 330 (1890); CLARK & MARSHALL,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 520 (5th ed., Kearney 1952).
58. Commonwealth v. Parker, 165 Mass. 526, 43 N.E. 499 (1896).
59. Regina v. Stanbury, Leigh & C. 128, 9 Cox C.C. 94, 169 Eng. Rep. 1332
(1862); People v. Cummings, 123 Cal. 269, 55 Pac. 898 (1899).
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1942,60 the common law stealing crimes were merged into the
single crime of theft.0 1
Since the enactment of the consolidated theft article in the
Criminal Code and the amendment to article 13 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, granting venue wherever a "substantial
element" of a crime could be found, few theft cases involving
venue problems have arisen in Louisiana. Prior to 1942, how-
ever, in cases involving several parishes, the Louisiana Supreme
Court had encountered considerable difficulty in determining the
proper venue. Of particular interest for purposes of the present
discussion were a series of cases62 arising in 1940 which involved
the crimes of embezzlement, obtaining by false pretenses, "double
dipping," and other miscellaneous but related offenses. At that
time the court was applying the rule that the parish where the
act constituting the "gist" of the offense was committed should
have venue. 3 The court appeared satisfied in all of the decisions
that the "gist" of the crimes involved was the unlawful obtain-
ing, but it still had difficulty in determining the parish in which
the property was obtained. For example, the court had to deter-
mine whether venue was proper in the parish where a check or
other property was given or entrusted to the offender; where the
conversion took place; where the duty of the thief to account
was; where a check was cashed or deposited and other checks
were drawn on the account; or where the checks were honored
by the drawee bank. The only uniform decisions rendered in all
these cases were those involving commercial paper where the
court found that the obtaining was in the parish in which a ne-
gotiable instrument was honored by the drawee and the victim
ultimately lost his money.6 4 But even then the court evidently
ignored an earlier decision which had held that the offense did
not occur in the parish where the drawee bank was situated. 5
With the adoption in 1942 of the amendment to article 13,
60. La. Acts 1942, No. 43, p. 137.
61. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).
62. State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940); State v. Smith, 194 La.
1015, 195 So. 523 (1940); State v. Matheny, 194 La. 198, 193 So. 587 (1940);
State v. Terzia, 194 La. 583, 194 So. 27 (1940). For a discussion of these cases
and the problems involved, see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court
for the 1939-1940 Term-Criminal Law and Procedure, 3 LOUISIANA LAW RE-
VIEW 379 (1941).
63. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1939-1940
Term-Criminal Law and Procedure, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 379, 380 (1941).
64. State v. Smith, 194 La. 1015, 195 So. 523 (1940); State v. Terzia, 194
La. 583, 194 So. 27 (1940); State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940). But see
State v. Roy, 155 La. 238, 99 So. 205 (1924).
65. State v. Roy, 155 La. 238, 99 So. 205 (1924).
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permitting prosecution in any parish where a "substantial ele-
ment of the crime has been committed," 66 the Louisiana courts
should now abandon the technical and somewhat confusing rules
which characterized the above decisions and consider the more
workable solutions reached in other states having liberal venue
provisions. By applying the rules developed in other jurisdic-
tions, Louisiana courts should now be able to hold that: Venue is
proper where either the misappropriation or the conversion takes
place, if they occur in separate parishes,0 7 or where the fraudulent
representations are made.0 8 Venue also is proper in the parish
where the property leaves the hands of the victim, as well as in
the parish where it is received by the thief.69 A few cases indi-
cate that venue is also proper where a check is mailed to the
thief or where it is received by him. 70  Moreover, a defendant
can be prosecuted either in the parish where he was entrusted
with and formed the intent to steal the property,71 or in the par-
ish where it was his duty to account to his principal or bailor.7 2
One case indicates that he can also be tried in the parish where
the "impact" of his acts is felt.7 8 Other common law cases in-
volving misappropriation and negotiation of commercial paper
indicate that prosecution can now be brought where the drawee
honored the instrument 7 4 or where the defendant cashed it or
66. LA. R.S. 15:13 (1950).
67. Draughon v. State, 29 Ala. App. 385, 196 So. 290 (1940); State v. Hen-
gen, 106 Iowa 711, 77 N.W. 453 (1898); People v. Britton,- 134 App. Div. 275,
118 N.Y. Supp. 989 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
68. People v. Bocchio, 80 Cal. App. 138, 251 Pac. 672 (1926); State v. Knut-
sen, 168 Wash. 633, 12 P.2d 923 (1932); Troup v. State, 51 Okla. Crim. 438, 2
P.2d 591 (1931).
69. State v. Gibson, 132 Iowa 53, 106 N.W. 270 (1906); People v. Kastel,
221 App. Div. 315, 222 N.Y. Supp. 744 (3d Dep't 1927), aff'd, 250 N.Y. 518, 166
N.E. 307 (1927); Bozarth v. State, 56 Okla. Crim. 424, 41 P.2d 924 (1934).
70. State v. Smith, 162 Iowa 336, 144 N.W. 32 (1913); State v. Gibson,
132 Iowa 53, 106 N.W. 270 (1906); People v. Kastel, 221 App. Div. 315, 222 N.Y.
Supp. 744 (3d Dep't 1927).
71. People v. Mitchell, 49 App. Div. 531, 63 N.Y. Supp. 522 (4th Dep't 1900),
aff'd, 168 N.Y. 604, 61 N.E. 182 (1901); State v. Boulet, 5 Wash.2d 654, 106
P.2d 311 (1940). But see People v. Weed, 153 Misc. 404, 274 N.Y. Supp. 943
(1934); Rogers v. State, 14 Okla. Crim. 235, 170 Pac. 269 (1918), in which the
intent to steal was not formed in the county where the property was en-
trusted to the defendant.
72. Draughon v. State, 29 Ala. App. 385, 196 So. 290 (1940); State v. Bi-
santi, 233 Iowa 748, 9 N.W.2d 279 (1943); State v. Hengen, 106 Iowa 711, 77
N.W. 453 (1898).
73. People v. Wallace, 78 Cal. App.2d 726, 748, 178 P.2d 771, 784 (1947).
74. People v. Keller, 79 Cal. App. 612, 250 Pac. 585 (1926); State v. Gibson,
132 Iowa 53, 106 N.W. 270 (1906); State v. Johnson, 109 Kan. 239, 199 Pac.
104 (1921); State v. Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643, 67 Pac. 386 (1901); see State v.
Smith, 194 La. 1015, 195 So. 523 (1940); State v. Terzia, 194 La. 583, 194 So. 27
(1940),
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deposited it to his account.7 5 However, it is doubtful that trial
would be proper in any parish through which an instrument
merely passes, en route from the parish where it was cashed to
the drawee bank, since the passing of the instrument through
the parish would not be necessary to the commission of the crime,
but only incidental. Consequently, it would not be a substantial
element of the crime.
The difficulty of determining venue for a bi-parish crime is
illustrated by three different treatments of similar situations in
other jurisdictions. In a Mississippi case,7 6 a defendant hauled
cotton from County A to County B and sold it without informing
the buyer of the landlord's lien on it. The court held that the
offender could not be tried in the county from which the cotton
was taken. The court considered the crime as having been com-
mitted wholly within County B. The Kansas court, however, held
that the offender was subject to prosecution in the county from
which the property was taken."' The Kentucky court, on the
other hand, treated both counties as having jurisdiction. 8 Both
the Kansas and Kentucky courts, however, considered venue in
the first county proper only if the intent to defraud was formed
before the removal of the property from the first county.7 9 It is
submitted that the rule of the Kentucky court is the better one
and should be applied if the question arises in Louisiana.
Extortion
No Louisiana decisions have been discovered treating venue
problems in extortion cases. However, a New York case80 pre-
sented an interesting problem. As a result of threats made to the
drawer, a check was given to the defendant in County A as a
campaign contribution. The check was deposited in a bank in
County B and payment was made by the drawee bank in County
A. The court held that County B did not have jurisdiction on
75. State v. Steffner, 67 Cal. App. 1, 227 Pac. 690 (1924); State v. Smith,
162 Iowa 336, 144 N.W. 32 (1913); State v. Hastings, 77 N.D. 146, 41 N.W.2d
305 (1950); State v. Phillips, 42 Wash.2d 137, 253 P.2d 919 (1953).
76. Murry v. State, 98 Miss. 594, 54 So. 72 (1911).
77. State v. Gorman, 113 Kan. 740, 216 Pac. 290 (1923).
78. Collins v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 564, 133 S.W. 233 (1911), rev'd on
other grounds, 234 U.S. 634 (1914).
79. State v. Gorman, 113 Kan. 740, 216 Pac. 290 (1923); Collins v. Common-
wealth, 141 Ky. 564, 133 S.W. 233 (1911), rev'd on other grounds, 234 U.S. 634
(1914). The intent to misappropriate the property must be formed in the
county where the property is received by the defendant for venue to be
proper in that county. See People v. Weed, 153 Misc. 404, 274 N.Y. Supp. 943
(1934); Rogers v. State, 14 Okla. Crim. 235, 170 Pac. 269 (1918).
80. People v. Fowler, 31 N.Y. Crim. 95, 152 N.Y. Supp. 672 (1914).
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the ground that no act essential to the consummation of the crime
occurred in that county. The decision is consistent with the 1940
Louisiana cases involving commercial paper, referred to in the
treatment of theft cases,"' where payment by the drawee bank
was considered an important factor in determining venue. How-
ever, in Louisiana either parish should now have venue under
amended article 13, since a substantial element of the crime
would seem to have occurred in each parish.
Receiving Stolen Things
In Louisiana, as in other jurisdictions, the crime of receiving
stolen things is separate and distinct from the crime of theft.
Two common law decisions8 2 have held that a defendant cannot
be tried for the crime of receiving in a county where the articles
are stolen if he received them in another county. The same rule
should apply in Louisiana under amended article 13. In Louisi-
ana, the crime of receiving stolen things is defined as the "inten-
tional procuring, receiving, or concealing of anything of value
which has been the subject of any robbery or theft, under circum-
stances which indicate that the offender knew or had good reason
to believe that the thing was the subject of one of these of-
fenses.'83 This article has been applied to a venue problem in
the case of State v. Ellerbe.84 In that case the defendant received
stolen pigs in Parish A and removed them to Parish B. It was
held that Parish B was not the proper venue because the crime
was completed in Parish A where the animals were received.
The court stressed the language of the article which makes it a
crime to receive or conceal a stolen thing with knowledge of its
character and found that there had been possession, but no con-
cealing or receiving, in Parish B.8 5 One may wonder why the
court failed to apply the idea of a continuing crime as in theft
cases, but possibly the court was reluctant to extend a legal fic-
tion. Apart from the applicability of the concept of a continuing
crime, however, the case seems correctly decided. It is interesting
to note that the Nevada court has also refused to extend the
concept of the continuing offense to receiving stolen things. In
the case of State v. Pray,8 6 the defendant purchased, paid for, and
81. State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940); State v. Smith, 194 La
1015, 195 So. 523 (1940); State v. Terzia, 194 La. 583, 194 So. 27 (1940).
82. Allison v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 254 (1885); People v. Zimmer, 174
App. Div. 470, 160 N.Y. Supp. 459 (2d Dep't 1916).
83. LA. R.S. 14:69 (1950).
84. 217 La. 639, 47 So.2d 30 (1950).
85. State v. Ellerbe, 217 La. 639, 644, 47 So.2d 30, 31 (1950).
86. 30 Nev. 206, 94 Pac. 218 (1908).
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received stolen ore in County A and then transported it to
County B. Venue was held improper in the latter county. The
Nevada court indicated that the offense was completed where
the ore was intentionally received. Transportation of the prop-
erty into County B to sell it, therefore, was not an act consum-
mating or necessary to the consummation of the crime.87 Thus,
the court refused to ,apply the continuing crime concept.
Two other common law decisions are of interest. A Kansas
decision88 has held that where a defendant goes from one county
to another to receive stolen things he cannot be tried in the
former. It is submitted that a trip from one county to the other
in such a case is not a substantial element of the crime. However,
in a hypothetical situation, similar in principle to the case there
under consideration,89 the Kentucky court indicated that if a
defendant, knowing the stolen character of the goods, bought
them in County A and took corporeal possession of them in
County B, either county would have jurisdiction. Such acts
would seem to satisfy the requirements of Louisiana's amended
article 13 should the situation be presented here.
Bigamy
In Louisiana, if a bigamous marriage were contracted in one
parish and the defendants went to another parish where they
lived together, it appears that venue for a bigamy prosecution
would be proper in either parish. The marriage would consti-
tute a substantial element of the crime." Compare, however, a
case 9' in which the Utah court held that where there is a lawful
marriage contracted in one county and a bigamous one in an-
other, venue is proper only in the county where the bigamous
marriage was celebrated. The court reasoned that the existence
of the lawful marriage in the first county, although it must be
shown to prove the second marriage bigamous, was not a sub-
stantial element of the crime 
92
Forgery
Article 72 of the Louisiana Criminal Code9" combines the
common law crimes of forgery and uttering forged instruments.9 4
87. State v. Pray, 30 Nev. 206, 223, 94 Pac. 218, 221 (1908).
88. State v. Rider, 46 Kan. 332, 26 Pac. 745 (1891).
89. Ellison v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 305, 227 S.W. 458 (1921).
90. LA. R.S. 14:76 (1950).
91. State v. Graham, 23 Utah 278, 64 Pac. 557 (1901).
92. Id. at 288, 64 Pac. at 559.
93. LA. R.S. 14:72 (1950).
94. Ibid.
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This must be kept in mind in evaluating common law precedents.
Several common law courts have established rules which could
be applied in Louisiana under amended article 13. The Iowa
Supreme Court has held that, where a defendant signed another's
name to a negotiable instrument in one county and filled in the
body of the instrument in another county, he would be amenable
to a forgery prosecution in the latter.9 5 The converse would seem
as reasonable: prosecution would also be permissible in the
county in which the offender signed the name of the other person,
since such signing is as much a forgery as is completing the body
of the instrument. A California court has held that, where the
instrument is forged in one county and deposited for collection
in another, venue is proper in either.9 6 In an Oklahoma case
9 7
the defendant forged a mortgage release in one county, and, im-
personating the mortgagee, acknowledged the execution of the
release before a notary public in another county. The court
found that trial in the first county was proper.
Alabama and Mississippi courts have held that, if a forged
instrument is sent from one county to another, the sender may
be prosecuted in either county for uttering.9 8 A similar result
would probably be reached under Louisiana's amended article 13.
A California decision9 9 involved the deposit of a raised check in
a bank in County A, drawn on a bank in County B. In due course,
the check was paid by the drawee bank in County B. However,
the latter county was denied jurisdiction to try the case. The
court felt that the crime was completed when the check was
presented to the bank in County A, and that no subsequent acts
were substantial elements of the crime. 100 In a subsequent case' 10
another California court has said that this decision was not in
accord with the jurisprudence of the state and should be dis-
regarded. This later view is certainly in accord with the Lou-
isiana rule that the parish in which the drawee bank is located
is the proper venue for the trial of theft cases. Forgery seems to
be nothing but a special variation of theft.
95. State v. Spayde, 110 Iowa 726, 80 N.W. 1058 (1899); see Robinson v.
Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 129, 288 S.W. 1044 (1926).
96. People v. Gerundo, 112 Cal. App.2d 863, 247 P.2d 398 (1952).
97. Arnold v. State, 15 Okla. Crim. 519, 178 Pac. 897 (1919).
98. Seay v. State, 21 Ala. App. 339, 108 So. 620 (1925); Bradford v. State,
171 Miss. 8, 156 So. 655 (1934). But see State v. Hudson, 13 Mont. 112, 32 Pac.
413 (1893), where venue was held proper only in the county where the forged
instrument was received.
99. People v. Ballas, 55 Cal. App. 748, 204 Pac. 401 (1921).
100. Id. at 751, 204 Pac. at 402.
101. People v. Megladdery, 40 Cal. App.2d 748, 106 P.2d 84 (1940).
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Abortion
There seems to be no Louisiana decision concerning venue
in abortion cases, but several common law decisions are worthy
of discussion. Under a statute making death of the woman or a
miscarriage a necessary element of the crime of abortion, the
Indiana Supreme Court has held that the county in which the
woman died, as well as the county where the abortion was per-
formed, is a proper place for trial.10 2 The Louisiana abortion
statute does not make miscarriage or death an element of the
crime.1 3 In Iowa, where there is a statute similar to ours, the
Supreme Court has held the crime to be completed when the
abortion is performed and refused to permit prosecution in the
county of subsequent miscarriage or death.0 4 A California case
0 5
presented the question whether certain acts constituted substan-
tial elements of the crime. Preliminary arrangements for per-
forming abortions on three women were made in County A.
This consisted of physical examinations, the fixing of the fees
to be charged, and the making of three definite appointments
for the performance of the abortions. The abortions were per-
formed in County B. The court held County A to be proper for
the venue of the trial, treating the steps taken there as part of
the crimes later consummated in County B. It is submitted that
the steps taken in County A might have been considered mere
acts of preparation.
Offenses Requiring Transmission or Publication
The majority rule is that a person who publishes libelous
matter may be prosecuted in any county in which the matter is
circulated. 0 6 Prior to the amendment of article 13, the Louisiana
rule was that the person could be prosecuted only in the parish
where the libelous matter was printed,107 or where it was dis-
seminated.1 8 If defamation is complete with the making of the
defamatory statement, the Louisiana rule seems to be the cor-
rect one. However, if the crime requires that the defamatory
matter be communicated to a third person, as the Louisiana
102. Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238, 46 N.E. 127 (1897).
103. LA. R.S. 14:87 (1950).
104. State v. Hollenbeck, 36 Iowa 112 (1872).
105. People v. Anderson, 90 Cal. App.2d 326, 202 P.2d 1044 (1949).
106. State ex rel. Taubman v. Huston, 19 S.D. 644, 104 N.W. 451 (1905).
107. State v. Moore, 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916).
108. State v. Briwa, 198 La. 970, 5 So.2d 304 (1941).
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defamation statute seems to require, 10 9 then the majority rule
would appear to be correct. There have apparently been no cases
in Louisiana on this subject since the amendment of article 13.
However, in other states having similar statutory provisions,.
either the county where the libelous matter is printed or any
county into which it is circulated has jurisdiction. 1 0 Under the
amended article 13, in any case involving defamation, threaten-
ing letters, or the like, it would be reasonable to find a substantial
element of the offense either in the parish where the defamatory
matter was printed or in the parish where the defamation ulti-
mately was communicated to a third person.
Miscellaneous Off enses
Operating a vehicle while intoxicated. In a Louisiana case"'
applying amended article 13, a defendant who, while under the
influence of intoxicating liquors, drove from one parish to an-
other, was held amenable to prosecution in either parish.
Bribery. A California case"12 has held that where the offer
or solicitation of a bribe is made and accepted in one county
and payment of the bribe is made in another, venue is proper in
either. A similar holding would seem correct under Louisiana's
amended article 13.
Gambling. Another California case 1" 3 has held that where a
person was induced in County A to go to a gambling house in
County B, the courts of County A had jurisdiction over the of-
fense, the acts of invitation being a part of the offense and re-
sulting in the final consummation of the offense in County B.
However, whether the Louisiana court would treat the acts of
invitation as a substantial element of the crime or as mere pre-
paratory acts is open to question.
Contaminating water supplies. Before the amendment of
article 13, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. International
Paper Co." 4 allowed prosecution in the parish where the con-
109. LA. R.S. 14:47 (1950): "Defamation is the malicious publication or
expression in any manner, to anyone other than the party defamed, of any-
thing which tends . . . [to expose anyone living or dead to hatred, contempt,
or ridicule]." (Emphasis added.)
110. State ex rel. Taubman v. Huston, 19 S.D. 644, 104 N.W. 451 (1905);
see Commonwealth v. Morton, 140 Ky. 628, 131 S.W. 506 (1910).
111. State v. Sawyer, 220 La. 932, 57 So.2d 899 (1952).
112. People v. Megladdery, 40 Cal. App.2d 748, 106 P.2d 84 (1940).
113. People v. Chase, 117 Cal. App. 775, 1 P.2d 60 (1931).
114. 201 La. 870, 10 So.2d 685 (1942).
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tamination took effect. It is submitted that prosecution should
be permissible in the parish where the dumping took place. Two
common law cases have shown that when the dumping of waste
matter in streams results in contamination of waters in a county
other than that in which the waste matter is dumped, the defen-
dant may be tried either in the county where the contaminating
substance was dumped into the stream,1 5 or in the county where
the contamination results."6
Violation of "blue sky" laws. No Louisiana cases have been
found, but two California decisions could be helpful should the
question of venue in cases of violation of "blue sky" laws arise in
Louisiana. In one case," 7 where a falsified application to register
securities was filed by a mining company in the branch office of
the Commissioner of Corporations in County A, and the applica-
tion was forwarded to the main office in County B, venue was
held proper in either. In the other case," 8 venue was also held
proper in either county where an offer to purchase unregistered
securities was mailed from County A to County B and an accep-
tance was returned to the first county.
Malfeasance in office. A New York case" 9 has discussed the
question of venue in this type of case. The defendant was com-
missioned to investigate the police force of a city and to submit
a report to the mayor. The investigation was held in County A;
the report, which the defendant was under a duty to submit in
County B, was not made. The court held that the crime con-
sisted of the failure to report, which failure was a "single act of
omission," and that the making of the investigation was a lawful
act which did not necessarily lead to the consummation of the
crime. The case indicates that prosecution should take place
where the failure to perform the official duty occurs. It is doubt-
ful whether a more liberal rule would result from the applica-
tion of Louisiana's amended article 13.
Criminal neglect of family. The Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure provides: "When any person shall desert or inten-
tionally not support his family . . . the offense may be prose-
cuted and punished: (1) In the parish where the person owing
the duty of support resides or is found, or (2) in the parish where
the last matrimonial domicile was established, or (3) in the par-
115. State v. Herring, 21 Ind. App. 157, 48 N.E. 598, 51 N.E. 951 (1897).
116. State v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co., 117 Iowa 524, 91 N.W. 794 (1902).
117. People v. Boggess, 194 Cal. 212, 228 Pac. 448 (1924).
118. People v. Twedt, 1 Cal.2d 392, 35 P.2d 324 (1934).
119. Murtagh v. Leibowitz, 303 N.Y. 311, 101 N.E.2d 753 (1951).
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ish where the person (or persons) to whom the duty of support
is owed establishes a bona fide residence, provided that this pro-
vision shall be effective only if the person to whom the duty of
support was owed was justified in establishing a separate resi-
dence.' 120 The third section of this article was applied in State
v. Maxie.'21 In that case the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the juvenile court of the parish in which minor children lived
with and were cared for by their maternal grandmother had
venue jurisdiction of the prosecution, although the defendant
resided in another parish and despite the Civil Code provision 22
making the father's domicile the domicile of the children. It is
interesting to note that the Supreme Court referred to the con-
stitutional requirement of trial in the parish where the crime
was committed as a general provision, superseded by the more
specific section of the Constitution establishing juvenile courts
and authorizing the legislature to regulate the proceedings there-
in. 2 3 However, article 16.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
was referred to as merely a declaratory rule of law as to where
the offense is really committed and thus not in conflict with the
constitutional provision that all trials shall take place in the
parish in which the offense was committed. 2 4 Significantly, the
court also cited amended article 13 as support for its decision,
stating that where several acts constituting a crime are commit-
ted in more than one parish, trial may be had in any parish
where a substantial element of the crime arose.125
Liquor law violations. No decisions involving such violations
have arisen in Louisiana since the amendment to article 13, but
prior to that time it was held in State v. Shields 26 that, under
the local option law,127 it is the sale and not the executory con-
tract for the sale of spirituous liquors that is denounced as the
offense. Consequently, one receiving orders in a dry parish for
spirituous liquors to be supplied from a general stock in a wet
parish could not be prosecuted for violation of the liquor law of
the dry parish, since the sale was not consummated there. 2 8 No
Louisiana decisions have been found concerning shipments be-
120. LA. R.S. 15:16.1 (1950).
121. 221 La. 518, 59 So.2d 706 (1952).
122. Art. 39, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
123. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 52.
124. State v. Maxie, 221 La. 518, 524, 59 So.2d 706, 708 (1952).
125. Ibid.
126. 110 La. 547, 34 So. 673 (1903).
127. LA. R.S. 26:581-595 (1950).
128. State v. Shields, 110 La. 547, 553, 34 So. 673, 675 (1903).
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tween two dry parishes, but in an Iowa case, 129 orders for liquor
were solicited by an agent in County A, subject to approval in
County B. Liquor was then shipped to County A. The court
stated that venue was proper in either county for prosecution of
the crime of unlawful sale of liquor. The Arizona Supreme Court
has stated that when whiskey was brought into the state in
violation of its prohibition laws, venue would be proper in every
county through which the whiskey was transported, although
the offense was not completed until the whiskey reached its
destination.130
Contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile. No Louisiana
decisions have been found concerning venue in this type of case.
However, in a Washington case, a letter written by the defen-
dant in County A was received and caused a juvenile to become
delinquent in County B. The court held that the defendant could
be tried in either county.1
3 1
Pandering. Several common law decisions have discussed
venue problems in pandering cases. There is much support for
the proposition that where a woman is induced in one county to
become a prostitute, and is taken or goes to another county and
becomes a prostitute as a result of the inducement, the person
so inducing the woman can be prosecuted in either county.
32
A California decision 33 indicates that even if the defendant's only
act was to have the female medically examined in the second
county, the inducement in the first county having been accom-
plished by his confederates, he may be tried in either county.
A Tennessee case 134 has held that where a woman agreed in one
county to meet the defendant in another county to be taken out
of the state for purposes of prostitution, venue jurisdiction
existed in the county because the crime was begun there.
Conclusion
It is submitted that the amendment of article 13 has solved
most of the troublesome venue problems. There is the possibility,
however, that amended article 13 will not be construed liberally,
if the recent decision in State v. Pollard35 can be considered
129. State v. Kriechbaum, 81 Iowa 633, 47 N.W. 872 (1891).
130. Reynolds v. State, 18 Ariz. 388, 161 Pac. 885 (1916).
131. State v. Bogart, 21 Wash.2d 765, 153 P.2d 507 (1944).
132. People v. Benenato, 77 Cal. App.2d 350, 175 P.2d 296 (1946); People v.
Mandell, 35 Cal. App.2d 368, 95 P.2d 704 (1939); People v. Marron, 140 Cal. App.
432, 35 P.2d 610 (1934) State v. Ashe, 182 Wash. 598, 48 P.2d 213 (1935).
133. People v. Benenato, 77 Cal. App.2d 350, 175 P.2d 296 (1946).
134. Whaley v. State, 187 Tenn. 507, 216 S.W.2d 17 (1948).
135. 215 La. 655, 41 So.2d 465 (1949).
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indicative of the court's attitude. In that case a road contractor
was charged with theft for obtaining state funds by making false
representations with respect to road work to be completed in
Caldwell Parish. The contractor had not used the required
materials in the construction of the road, had falsified the engi-
neer's reports and had prepared fraudulent statements of the
costs incurred-all in Caldwell Parish. The fraudulent estimate
was received by the State Department of Highways in East Baton
Rouge Parish, the parish in which the contract to construct the
road had been entered into. The' check in payment of the esti-
mate was drawn in East Baton Rouge Parish on a bank in that
parish and mailed to the contractor in a third parish, where he
deposited it to his account. The Louisiana Supreme Court held
that no substantial element of the crime occurred in Caldwell
Parish, treating the acts done there as mere preparation. 13 6 The
decision seems to be in conflict with most of the decisions reached
in other states. For example, in the similar New York case of
People v. Hudson Valley Construction Co.,137 a conspiracy to de-
fraud the state was formed in County A, where the construction
work was to be done and the materials were to be furnished. The
state was defrauded through excessive charges for the work and
materials. The court stated that the conspiracy initiated the
offense and constituted part of the crime and that the doing of
the work and the furnishing of the materials were necessary ele-
ments of the crime. Thus, under a statute similar to amended
article 13, venue was held proper in County A.138 In view of the
fact that the distinction between the two cited cases is very
slight, the different results must be attributed to a difference in
opinion as to how liberally the respective venue statutes should
be construed. It is submitted that the result in the New York case
is more in keeping with the Louisiana legislature's purpose in
amending article 13. Furthermore, the rules that the defendant
can be prosecuted where the effect of his fraudulent actions are
felt 39 or where "some of the false misrepresentations were
136. State v. Pollard, 215 La. 655, 665, 41 So.2d 465, 468 (1949).
137. 217 N.Y. 172, 111 N.E. 472 (1916); see Ex parte Myers, 119 Kan. 270,
237 Pac. 1026 (1925); State v. Mason, 61 Kan. 102, 58 Pac. 978 (1899). In sup-
port of State v. Pollard, 215 La. 655, 41 So.2d 465 (1949), however, see State v.
Robinson, 71 N.D. 463, 2 N.W.2d 183 (1942).
138. People v. Hudson Valley Construction Co., 217 N.Y. 172, 176, 111 N.E.
472, 474 (1916).
139. People v. Wallace, 78 Cal. App.2d 726, 748, 178 P.2d 771, 784 (1947).
For the proposition that the defendant can be tried in the county where the
effect of his acts are felt, see State v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co., 117 Iowa
524, 91 N.W. 794 (1902); Commonwealth v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 175 Ky.
267, 194 S.W. 345 (1917).
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made"140 might have been applied. Under the first rule, the par-
ish where the roads were to be built could be treated as the
parish affected by the defendant's criminal conduct and the one
in which the district attorney would have more reason and be
more likely to prosecute. While it should no longer be necessary
to designate one particular parish as the locus of the crime, the
court may still be confronted with questions as to whether a
"substantial element" of the crime is present in the parish se-
lected for prosecution. That the question is not always easy to
answer is indicated by the Pollard case. In situations where the
Louisiana Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to inter-
pret amended article 13, the rules developed in venue cases in
other jurisdictions should be of assistance.
James M. Dozier, Jr.
Acquisitive Prescription of Servitudes
Article 765, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870: "Continuous
and apparent servitudes may be acquired by title, or by a
possession of ten years . . .,
Article 3504, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870: "A continuous
apparent servitude is acquired by possession and the enjoy-
ment of the right for thirty years uninterruptedly, even with-
out a title or good faith."
The foregoing articles of the Louisiana Civil Code provide
two periods for the acquisitive prescription of continuous and
apparent servitudes. Their distinctive language and the mere
presence of two articles indicate that there are two distinct types
of prescription. The purpose of this Comment is to ascertain the
meaning of these two articles and to determine the requirements
of each type of acquisitive prescription; to examine the treatment
of the articles in the Louisiana jurisprudence; to consider briefly
the prescription of servitudes in other systems of law; and to
140. People v. Wicks, 11 App. Div. 539, 42 N.Y. Supp. 630, 633 (4th Dep't
1897), aff'd, 154 N.Y. 766, 49 N.E. 1102 (1898).
1. The amendment to this article made by La. Acts 1904, No. 25, p. 30,
dealing with the acquisition of public servitudes through possession of ten
years is not discussed in this Comment. No problem has arisen in inter-
preting this amendment. See Landry v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 166 La.
1069, 118 So. 142 (1928); Bomar v. Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497
(1926); Frierson v. Police Jury of Caddo Parish, 160 La. 957, 107 So. 709
(1926).
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